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Hill: Taxation

TAXATION
I.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

A. No Implied Limitation On Business License Tax For Cities
Of Less Than 70,000
South Carolina law authorizes cities to levy business license
taxes according to their population. The municipalities are
classified into three groups (towns of less than 1,000 persons,!
towns from 1,000 to 70,000,2 and cities over 70,0003), but only
the statute dealing with the largest municipalities contains
a limitation on the amount of such tax the city can impose.
Section 47-407 of the South Carolina Code provides that the
maximum license tax that a city with a population over 70,000
can impose is $2,500 annually.
Two Greenville insurance offices argued that since the
legislature had placed a limit on the business license tax which
could be imposed by cities of over 70,000 population, by implication, that limitation ($2,500) is the maximum tax which can
be exacted under the two code sections that apply to smaller
cities. That Greenville's population was less than 70,000 was
not disputed. The companies contended, therefore, that the
imposition of a license tax in excess of $2,500 was not authorized by section 47-271, that such a tax was "excessive
and unreasonable," and that the imposition violated "the
legislative intent as reflected in the foregoing statutes." 4
Judicial approval had already been given the statutory classification on a population basis for the imposition of license
taxes. 5 The only issue to be decided in United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co. v. City of Greenville,6 therefore, was whether
a city of less than 70,000 could impose, under section 47-271,
a business license tax of $2,500 per year.
The court found no basis to assume that the legislature
intended that the limitation of section 47-407 should apply
to cities affected by section 47-271:
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-173 (1962).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-271 (1962).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-407 (1962).

4. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. City of Greenville, 250 S.C.

136, 156 S.E.2d 417 (1967).
5. Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. City of Columbia, 242 S.C. 237, 130 S.E.2d

573 (1963).
6. 250 S.C. 136, 156 S.E.2d 417 (1967).
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Under the plain and unambigous terms of Section
47-271, it is clear that the Legislature did not intend
to impose a limitation of $2,500.00 upon the amount
of the tax which could be collected by cities with a
population of under seventy thousand. And, where
was intended, we cannot
it is clear that no limitation
7
one.
create
properly
B. Exemption to Use Tax Available to Producer-Processorof
Tangible Personal Property
An issue involving a particular exemption to South Carolina's sales and use taxes was raised in Monroe v. Livingston.8
The plaintiff Monroe owned machinery which he used to
process the eggs he produced for wholesale. The state tax
commission determined that the machinery was subject to the
use tax.9 Monroe contended that the machinery was exempt
from the levy by section 65-1404(17) of the South Carolina
Code, which eliminates "machines used in . . . processing
tangible personal property" from the sales and use taxes.
The commission's only basis for asserting tax liability was
that the particular exemption was available only to those
engaged in business as a processor. Since Monroe was a
poultry farmer and thus a producer, the commission asserted
that he could not also be a processor within the meaning of
the statute.
The supreme court discounted the commission's argument
and found for the taxpayer. The court stated the commission
had failed to show that Monroe was not a processor: "[T]here
is no basis in the statute to warrant withholding the exemption from the plaintiff because he was the producer of the
eggs which he was processing."' 1
The defendant commission weakly argued that the particular exemption had been construed by the commission over
a long period of time as inapplicable to poultry farmers, and
that such interpretation should continue. Administrative construction, the court replied, afforded no basis for the perpetuation of an erroneous application of the statute.
7. Id. at 140, 156 S.E.2d at 418-19.
8. 161 S.E.2d 243 (S.C. 1968).
9. S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 65-1421

(1962).

10. Monroe v. Livingston, 161 S.E.2d 243, 244 (S.C. 1968).
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C. Consolidated School District Assumes Liabilities of Constituent Districts
On June 8, 1967, legislation was approved which consolidated, effective July 1, 1968, the eight existing school districts of Charleston County into one county-wide district."
At the time of the enactment of the law, four of the districts
to be consolidated had outstanding bonded indebtedness, while
the other four were relatively debt-free. Section 11 of the
Act, 2 around which the controversy in Smythe v. Stroman's
centered, provided that the new consolidated district would
not assume the bonded indebtedness that the individual districts had incurred prior to consolidation.
If section 11 were given effect, the taxpayers of the old
constituent districts would have to service the debts of their
particular district after consolidation. This would amount to
a levy of from five mills in District No. 10, to eight and a
half mills in District No. 20.
The taxpayers of the districts with bonded indebtedness
attacked the validity of section 11, contending that the total
liabilities of the consolidated district, as well as the total assets, should be the responsibility of the entire consolidated
district. If this argument were given effect and section 11
was declared invalid, a uniform tax (estimated to be three
mills in 1968) would be imposed throughout the new district
to service the consolidated debt.
The trial court ordered section 11 stricken as invalid, and
the supreme court, in a four paragraph per curiam decision,
adopted the trial court disposition, reporting the order of the
lower court.
The lower court noted that the legislature must have been
uncertain from the outset of the validity of section 11 because of a disclaimer in the section which denominated it
11. LV S.C.

STATS. AT LARGE

470 (No. 340, 1967).

12. LV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 470, 475 (No. 340, § 11, 1967) provides:
The Charleston County School District shall not assume any
bonded indebtedness incurred prior to July 1, 1968, by any of
the present school districts. The bonded debt of the present

school districts incurred prior to July 1, 1968 shall remain the
obligations of the respective constituent districts after July 1,

1968 which shall continue to be taxed accordingly. The provisions of Section 11 are not an essential inducement to the enactment of this act.

13. 162 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 1968).
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"not an essential inducement to the enactment of this act." 14
It found ample authority in both case law1 5 and in the code10
for the proposition that upon consolidation of school districts
whereby the consolidated district succeeds to all the assets
of the former districts, the consolidated district also assumes
all the liabilities and obligations of the constituent districts.

The supreme court held that since the general statute17 had
declared that the liabilities of the original districts would be
assumed by the consolidated district, "the general statute
'
8
controls and invalidates the special provisions of section 11.8'
The supreme court, therefore, struck section 11 from the
Act, had the consolidated district assume all existing debts of
the constituent districts, required the indebtedness existing
prior to June 7, 1968, to be included in the amount of bonds
the district could issue under the constitutional debt limitation, 19 and declared the remainder of the act to be valid after
section 11 was stricken.
D. Tax on Soft Drink Syrup Construed as Sales or Use Tax
Reynolds v. South Carolina Tax Commission20 involved the
construction of a state tax statute in relation to federal law.
The plaintiff Reynolds, a contractor for food services for the
Marine Corps Air Station at Beaufort, refused to affix state
tax stamps to the containers of syrup used to mix soft drinks
as required by South Carolina law. 2 ' Reynolds contended that
14. LV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 470, 475 (No. 340, § 11, 1967). As further
precaution, the legislature inserted a saving clause in the act as section
15: "If any part of this act shall be held unconstitutional such unconstitutionality shall not effect the remainder of this act." LV S.C. STATS.
AT LARGE 470, 476 (No. 340, § 15, 1967).
15. E.g., Walker v. Bennett, 125 S.C.389 118 S.E. 779 (1923).
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-114.3 (1962) provides:
Upon consolidation of any two or more school districts, all
property, real and personal, and all assets of the districts forming the consolidated school district shall become the property of
the consolidated district and all liabilities of the consolidating
districts shall become the obligations of such consolidated district. Each such consolidated district shall be a body politic and
corporate and its board of trustees shall have such powers as are
provided by law.
17. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-114.3 (1962).
18. Smythe v. Stroman, 162 S.E.2d 168, 170 (S.C. 1968).
19. S.C. CONST. art. 10, § 5.
20. 162 S.E.2d 259 (S.C. 1968).
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-752 (1962) provides:
For each gallon of syrup for use at soda fountains in mixing
any drink which when mixed would be classified as a soft drink,
there shall be affixed to the original container soft drinks license tax stamps, at the rate of one dollar per gallon.
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(1) his place of business had been ceded to the United States
by law22 and thus it was without the jurisdiction of South

Carolina for tax purposes, and (2) that since his business
was under contract with the Marine Corps Exchange, it was a
federal instrumentality and immune from state taxation.
The trial court validated Reynolds' contentions and held
that he was entitled to recover the taxes paid under protest.
But the supreme court had little trouble refuting both arguments, finding the trial court in error, and reversing the
decision.

23

Disposing first of the second contention, the court found
that "the mere fact that a private corporation conducts its
States does not
business under a contract with the United
24
make it an instrumentality of the latter."
To decide the first contention, the court had to consider
the Buck Act,2 5 which receded to the states sufficient sov-

ereignty over the federal areas within its territorial limits
26
to enable the state to levy and collect sales and use taxes.
The act defined "sales or use tax" as "any tax levied on, with
respect to, or measured by, sales, receipts from sales, purchases, storage, or use of tangible personal property...
The tax commission contended that the South Carolina
statute was a sales or use tax within the meaning of the Buck
Act, and thus jurisdiction to levy the tax had been receded
to the state. Reynolds, noting that section 65-752 characterizes the imposition as a license tax, argued that that the Buck
Act, applying only to sales or use taxes, was inapplicable to
give the Commission jurisdiction. The court answered that
22. S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 39-51 to -54 (1962).
23. Reynolds v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 162 S.E.2d 259 (S.C. 1968).
24. Id. at 261.

25. 4 U.S.C. §§ 105-10 (1964).

26. The Buck Act provides:
No person shall be relieved from liability for payment of, collection of, or accounting for any sales or use tax levied by any
State, or by any duly constituted taxing authority therein, having jurisdiction to levy such a tax, on the ground that the sale
or use, with respect to which such tax is levied, occurred in
whole or in part within a Federal area; and such State or taxing authority shall have full jurisdiction and power to levy and
collect any such tax in any Federal area within such State to
the same extent and with the same effect as though such area
was not a Federal area.
4 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1964).
27. 4 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1964).
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the character of the tax was determined by its operation
and effect and that the only issue was whether the tax was
a sales or use tax as defined by the Buck Act:
The tax levied and sought to be collected is clearly
a tax upon the use of syrup at such fountains in
mixing any drink which, when mixed, would be classified as a soft drink. We think the foregoing is
made perfectly clear by Section 65-753 of the Code
which defines the word "syrup" as being the compound mixture or basic ingredients used in making,
mixing or compounding of soft drinks at soda fountains.28
Since the tax was obviously aimed at the use of the syrup
and not at its licensing, the court concluded that the Buck
Act contained substantial authorization for the commission
to levy a tax measured by the storage or use of the syrup,
and that section 65-752 is a use tax within the meaning of
the Buck Act.
IL

CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF STATUTES

A. Tax on Fiduciary Does Not Discriminate Against NonResident Beneficiary
A trustee under a testator's will who distributed income
from real property to nonresident beneficiaries of the trust
attacked the constitutionality of an amended South Carolina
tax statute in Peoples National Bank of Greenville v. South
Carolina Tax Commission.2 9
The revised statute"0 levied a tax on fiduciaries with respect to the part of their net income derived from real
property or tangible personal property in South Carolina
which is distributable to a nonresident beneficiary. The tax
imposed is charged against the trust.
Prior to the amendment the plaintiff trustee had distributed the net income to the nonresidents, made a fiduciary
return to the tax commission, and reported no tax due. Re28. Reynolds v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 162 S.E.2d 259, 262 (S.C.

1968) (emphasis by the court).
29. 250 S.C. 187, 156 S.E.2d 769 (1967).

80.

S.C. CoDE ANN. § 65-223(b) (Supp. 1967), amending S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 65-223 (1962).
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lying on the 1963 amendment,8 1 however, the commission
rejected the trustee's 1963 return and assessed a tax on the
net income reported. The trustee paid under protest and
brought the action to recover, contending that the effect of
the amended statute is to discriminate against non-residents
because only one $800 exemption is allowed to the fiduciary,
even though the income in this instance is distributed to
four nonresident beneficiaries. Since each resident is aft
forded an $800 exemption, the plaintiff's sole contention
was that the statute worked to discriminate against the nonresident, whose trustee was not allowed an exemption for
each beneficiary. This violated, the plaintiff argued, the
uniform and equal rate provisions of the South Carolina constitution 2 and the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.33
The court disagreed with the plaintiff and with the trial
court which had found against the tax commission. Pointing
out that although the levy is called a tax on the fiduciary,
the tax is paid from funds otherwise distributable to the
beneficiaries, and thus the practical effect of the law is to
exact a tax from the beneficiary.
The court advised that a nonresident who receives income
subject to taxation in South Carolina is required to file a
return to the state tax commission,8 4 but he is protected because his tax is calculated at the same rate as a resident, 8
and he may prorate the same exemption as a resident.8 6
Thus, the court concluded, the amended statute is only
nominally a tax on the fiduciary - the beneficiary is the real
taxpayer:
In the light of these realities and of the legislative
purpose to assure the collection of taxes on income
distributable to nonresident beneficiaries, we think
31. LIII S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 279 (No. 245, 1963). The amendment
rewrote the first paragraph and added sub-division "b" to § 65-223.
32. S.C. CoNsT. art. 10, § 1.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The court does not reveal under which
sections of the federal and state constitutions the plaintiff claims he was
suffering discrimination. The author assumes that the fourteenth amendment and the South Carolina constitution section cited supra at note 32
are the applicable provisions.
34. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-291 (1962).

35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-221 (1962).
36. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-225(6) (1962).
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that the challenged provision of the statute should
be construed as a withholding3 7 tax device, rather
than as a tax on the fiduciary.
Such a construction, the court continued, allows the nonresident beneficiary, when filing his South Carolina return,
to take credit for the amount paid to the state by the
fiduciary. Thus, the issue of discrimination was resolved in
favor of the statute's constitutionality. Under the court's
construction, the nonresident beneficiaries are afforded equality of treatment under the state tax statutes.
The court appeared to have some doubt whether the statute
could be approved solely as a tax on the fiduciary, without
construing the levy as a withholding device. After citing
several principles of statutory construction which indicate
that a statute should be construed to be valid whenever possible, the court concluded that its duty "to sustain the validity
of an act of the General Assembly, on any ground fairly
appearing from the record, requires that we follow this
course."3 8
B. The Industrial Revenue Bond Act
Probably the most important decision in a tax-related area
in the past year was Elliott v. McNair,0 which declared the
Industrial Revenue Bond Act 40 to be constitutional. The Act,
which enabled state public agencies (County Boards) to give
assistance to new or expanding industries through the use
of tax-exempt revenue bonds, withstood a withering barrage
of attacks on its validity, including contentions that the law
violated the constitution by creating a public debt, by pledging the state's credit for the benefit of a particular company,
by failing to serve a public purpose, and by affording special
privileges to a private corporation. The court patiently studied each contention before concluding that "[t]he Act here
under consideration is a valid exercise of the legislative
power of the General Assembly of this State." 41
37. Peoples Nat'l Bank of Greenville v. South Carolina Tax Conmm'n,
250 S.C. 187, 156 S.E.2d 769 (1967).
38. Id. at 193, 156 S.E.2d at 772.
39. 250 S.C. 75, 156 S.E.2d 421 (1967). For a detailed discussion of this
decision see 20 S.C.L. REv. 106 (1968).
40. S.C. CODn ANN. §§ 14-399.21 to -99.35 (Supp. 1967).
41. Elliott v. McNair, 250 S.C. 75, 98, 156 S.E.2d 421, 433 (1967).
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One issue not decided in Elliott was the applicability of the
Act with respect to projects begun prior to the act's passage
(March 21, 1967) or its effective date (January 1, 1967).
The question was raised in Nuessner v. McNair,42 which involved two Greenville County projects begun in 1966. The
plants had arranged for temporary financing in anticipation
of obtaining industrial revenue bond financing when it became available. The court, concerned with whether it was
the legislature's intention to confer the benefits of the Act
on industries which located in the state prior to the Act's
passage but not then completed or financed, found that the
General Assembly did not limit the counties to the acquisition
of projects commenced after the effective date:
It is our conclusion that the Legislature intended the
benefits of the Act to be as far-reaching as possible
and that the time of the commencement of the construction of a project had no significance as to
whether the provisions of the Act were available
if the projects were essential to the state's economy
and the welfare of its people. The effective date
of the Act, in our opinion, applies solely to the time
when the county could exercise the powers granted
43
therein.
III. EFFECT OF STATE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION
OF A PROPERTY INTEREST IN A FEDERAL COURT

TAx CONTROVERSY
Lakewood Plantation,Inc. v. United States, 44 an action for
the refund of federal income taxes in the United States
District Court, is an important extension of the doctrine of
the much-heralded Supreme Court decision of Commissioner
v. Bosch. 45 Although it is not within the scope of this survey
to consider federal tax cases, Lackewood is reviewed because
of its importance in determining the significance that a state
trial court adjudication may have in a subsequent federal
tax litigation.
The Supreme Court held in Bosc&that when federal estate
tax liability turns on the character of a property interest
42. 250 S.C. 257, 157 S.E.2d 410 (1967).
43. Id. at 263, 157 S.E.2d at 412-13.
44. 272 F. Supp. 290 (D.S.C. 1967).
45. 387 U.S. 456 (1967).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

9

SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAWVol.
REVIEW
[Vol.
20
South
Carolina
Law Review,
20, Iss. 4 [2020],
Art. 10

held and transferred by a decedent under state law, federal
authorities are not conclusively bound by the determination
made of such property interest in a proceeding in which the
United States is not a party.46 But the doctrine of the decision has been expanded beyond the relatively narrow holding into the previously chaotic realm of the effect of a
previous state trial court's determination of a property interest in a federal court tax controversy.
In Lakewood, the grantor conveyed timber lands in 1953
to Lakewood Plantation, a corporation. When the grantor,
who was virtually the sole owner of Lakewood at that time,
sold the timber off the land, he reported the income on his
personal federal tax return but not as any income to the
corporation. Upon investigation in 1957, the Internal Revenue Service determined that the income was that of the
corporation, not of the grantor personally. The grantor first
obtained a correction deed, then instituted a nonadversary
civil action, in which the United States was not a party,
to reform the original deed ab initio to reflect that a mutual
mistake had been made, and that the grantor had intended
to reserve to himself for twenty years the timber rights on
the property. In a 1960 decree, the state trial court ordered
that the reformation be made effective as of the date of the
original deed. Lakewood then brought action to recover the
federal income taxes paid from 1954 through 1956, and the
overriding issue in the litigation was the admissibility of the
state court decree reforming the deed.
In ruling on the admissibility of the reformation decree,
the district court considered Bosch and found that there the
correctness of the local adjudications depended on whether
the proper state law had been applied to the undisputed
facts. In Lakewood, however, the validity of the state trial
court ruling hinged on a disputed factual question - whether
there had really been a mutual mistake when the 1953 deed
was made without reserving timber rights to the grantor.
Noting that Bosch decided that the federal court must make
an independent review of the state law under the principles
of EMie Railroad v. Tompkins 47 and adjudicate the disputed
property rights accordingly, the district court stated the Lake46. Id. at 457. For a detailed comment on Bosch, see 20 S.C.L. Rnv. 477
(1968).
47. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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wood issue: "If the government in accordance with Bank of
New Haven48 and Bosch is not bound by a state trial court
decree of property rights based on a misapplication of state
law, is it bound by such a decree based on erroneous findings
49
of fact?"
The court's answer to its own question added a new dimension to Bosch:
If a state court decree is not binding on the government on erroneous findings of state law the resultant
logic of the Bank of New Haven and the Bosch decisions is that by a like token the government is not
bound by a decree based upon erroneous findings of
fact. The mandate of Bank of New Haven and Bosch
appears to be that federal tax liability should be litigated exclusively in the federal courts with proper
regard to state law when property rights are disputed. 0
Thus the court ruled that the 1960 reformation decree and
the underlying testimony and evidence would be inadmissible
in the federal action, and the case was set over for trial
on the merits.
CHARLES E. HILL

48. Second Nat'l Bank of New Haven v. United States, 387 U.S. 456
(1967). Bank of New Haven is the companion case to Bosch.
49. Lakewood Plantation, Inc. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 290, 294
(D.S.C. 1967).
50. Id.
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